The Idea

The claim states that the time of Ibn Rushd was not a time in which human reason became independent of invisible reference points. In other words, thought in that era continued to operate within a broad religious or metaphysical horizon, and had not yet reached the form that would later emerge in modernity. In this sense, Ibn Rushd is not presented as the end of the history of independent reason, but as an early moment within a longer and more complex history.

Concise Formulation

The time of Ibn Rushd did not witness the independence of human reason from invisible reference points

Its Place in the Book’s Argument

This statement serves the argument that rejects a simplistic reading of intellectual history. The presence of a rational thinker does not automatically mean the birth of a fully rational age. From this perspective, Ibn Rushd is used to clarify the difference between the presence of important rational elements and the realization of comprehensive epistemic independence. This distinction is essential for understanding how modernity is historically constructed, not brought about all at once.

Why It Matters

The importance of this claim lies in the fact that it prevents projecting modern concepts onto earlier periods. It pushes the reader to distinguish between a brilliant intellectual moment and a comprehensive transformation in the structure of knowledge. This distinction is necessary for understanding Ibn Rushd’s place within the history of Islamic thought without turning him into a symbol that exceeds the conditions of his time.

Reading Questions

  • Does this claim diminish Ibn Rushd’s value, or place him in his historical context?
  • What is the difference between rationality existing within a religious framework and the complete independence of reason?

Documentation Level

High: the claim appears in a clear location in the book’s material.

Brief Evidence

The claim states that the time of Ibn Rushd was not a time in which human reason became independent of invisible reference points. In other words, thought in that era continued to operate within a broad religious or metaphysical horizon, and had not yet reached the form that would later emerge in modernity. In this sense, Ibn Rushd is not presented as the end of the history of independent reason, but as an early moment within a longer history.