Formulation of the claim
Uṣūl al-fiqh reinforces the authority of interpretation and inference, and grants them a methodological authority within the juristic tradition.
Explanation
Arkoun understands uṣūl al-fiqh as an epistemic apparatus that is not limited to organizing reasoning; rather, it elevates interpretation itself by linking it to the rules of inference and to its legitimacy. Thus understanding no longer remains a wholly free act, but becomes a practice governed by a normative authority formed within the discipline.
Within this framework, uṣūl al-fiqh appears as one of the tools that consolidated the standing of the exegete and the jurist, because both speak in the name of a method that regulates reading and confers validity upon it. This is why, in Arkoun’s view, this claim is tied to the question of who has the right to interpret, and how that authority is formulated within the Islamic tradition.
Its place in the book’s argument
This atom enters into Arkoun’s critique of the epistemic structures that produced classical Islamic mentality, where the religious sciences are not seen merely as tools of understanding, but also as means of fixing the boundaries of what is acceptable in interpretation. From here comes the value of uṣūl al-fiqh in the overall argument: it is an example of a science that organizes and frames reading, rather than leaving it open to broader interrogation.
Limits of the claim
This atom should not be taken as a comprehensive judgment on uṣūl al-fiqh as a whole, nor reduced to a purely negative meaning. What is intended here is the highlighting of a specific function: supporting the authority of interpretation and inference within a particular epistemic system.