The idea
This claim links the closure of the gate of ijtihad to the dominance of imitation within fundamentalist thought. When ijtihad declines, reliance on inherited tradition becomes dominant, and the capacity to question judgments and reconsider them weakens. At that point, thought loses its critical vitality and becomes closer to repetition than to creativity or renewal.
Condensed formulation
Closure of the gate of ijtihad: fundamentalist thought is ruled by imitation
Its place in the book’s argument
This claim occupies a pivotal place in the book’s argument because it explains how an intellectual system shifts from an open field of debate to one governed by submission. The issue is not a passing description of imitation, but an account of its effects on the very possibility of thought itself. From this perspective, the claim is directly connected to the critique of fundamentalism as a structure that halts questioning.
Why it matters
Its importance lies in showing why renewal seems difficult within an intellectual horizon that places imitation above ijtihad. This helps clarify Arkoun’s stance on intellectual stagnation, not as a partial flaw, but as the result of an intellectual structure that weakens critique and limits the historical movement of thought.
Reading questions
- How does the book describe the relationship between ijtihad and renewal on the one hand, and imitation on the other?
- Does this claim mean that any thought in which ijtihad weakens loses its capacity to develop?
Degree of documentation
High: the claim appears in a clear location within the book’s material.