Formulation of the Claim

The historical-critical reading of the Qur’an differs from the classical jurisprudential reading.

Explanation

For Arkoun, religious texts are not read solely as ready-made rulings; they are also understood within the history of their formation, reception, and use. He therefore places the historical-critical reading in contrast with the jurisprudential reading, which tends to fix meaning within a system of deduction and codification.

This distinction is not intended to negate jurisprudence, but to show that jurisprudential reading operates within a certain horizon that differs from the horizon of historical inquiry. From here, the distance between the two readings becomes part of Arkoun’s critique of the traditional way of dealing with the Qur’anic text.

Its Place in the Book’s Argument

This claim comes within the broader thrust of Arkoun’s thesis, which calls for opening foundational texts to historical and critical tools of analysis rather than relying on inherited jurisprudential treatment. It aligns with his effort to question the limits that classical readings have imposed on understanding the Qur’an and its meanings.

Limits of the Claim

This claim should not be taken as a final judgment on jurisprudence, nor should every jurisprudential reading be reduced to rigidity; it first and foremost indicates a difference in method and epistemic horizon. Nor does it mean that historical reading provides a direct jurisprudential alternative in every case.

Brief Evidence

Arkoun distinguishes between the historical-critical reading of the Qur’an and the jurisprudential/classical reading, which tends to fix meaning within a system of deduction and codification. In his view, religious texts are not read merely as ready-made rulings; they are also understood within the history of their formation, reception, and use. It is therefore not correct to reduce the Qur’an to its jurisprudential reading alone.