Formulation of the Claim

Reason does not operate independently of imagination, memory, and the social imaginary.

Explanation

In Arkoun’s thought, reason is not understood as a faculty separate from the other dimensions of human experience, but rather as an activity that intersects with imagination, memory, and the images and representations produced by the social imaginary. The formulation of the claim therefore points to a constant coupling between thinking and the acts of recalling, representing, and imagining that accompany it.

This coupling means that meaning is not formed within reason alone, but within a network of presence and absence and symbolic accumulation. Memory preserves, imagination reshapes, and the social imaginary supplies thought with its shared images, while reason remains part of this interaction rather than standing outside it.

Its Place in the Book’s Argument

This claim atom falls within Arkoun’s broader effort to dismantle the reductive image of reason and to reconnect thought to its human, social, and cultural context. It supports his related theses that reject confining knowledge to a single dimension and link the formation of ideas to what collective memory stores and to the possibilities opened by imagination.

Limits of the Claim

This claim should not be understood as diminishing the value of reason or equating it with illusion; rather, it describes its relation to structures of representation, memory, and imagination. Nor does it go so far as to say that the imaginary fully determines thought; it points instead to their interweaving.

Brief Evidence Passage

If reason is, psychologically speaking, one of the fundamental faculties of the human soul, it should be understood that it carries out its work only through constant interaction with another faculty, namely imagination, the imaginary, and memory. Human beings are not reason alone, and this means that the rationalities produced by reason are not imposed exclusively from external factors upon the soul; rather, they are in all cases influenced to a greater or lesser degree by the data of individual and collective memory, by the creative power of inventive imagination, and by the powerful and, to a greater or lesser extent, stimulating impulses of the social imaginary. These basic or primary psychological data are not always taken into account by historians of thought. There is no doubt that they